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Today, there is a family of celebrated police strategies that teach 
the importance of cracking down on petty crime and urban nuisance as 
the key to effective crime control. Under the “broken windows” 
appellation, this strategy is linked in the public mind with New York City 
and the alleged successes of its police department in reducing the rate of 
crime over the past two decades. This paper is critical of such order 
maintenance approaches to policing: I argue that infringements of civil 
liberty by such departments could be reduced if the departments looked 
at law more as a good to be served for its own sake and less as an 
instrument for the promotion of order. In other words, a shot of legalism 
is the correct medicine to reduce police misconduct that pierces the 
law’s protections of citizen freedom. 
This Article contributes to the critical literature on broken 
windows policing by reassessing the work of the famous Harvard 
scholar (James Q. Wilson) who fathered it. The Article takes Wilson’s 
work and turns it on its head, drawing very different prescriptive 
conclusions than he did himself.  
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Today, there is a family of police strategies that teach the 
importance of cracking down on petty crime and urban nuisance as the 
key to effective crime control. Under the “broken windows” appellation, 
this strategy is linked in the public mind with New York City and the 
alleged successes of its police department in reducing the rate of crime 
over the past two decades. This article is critical of such order 
maintenance approaches to policing: I argue that infringements of civil 
liberties by such departments could be reduced if the departments looked 
at law more as a good to be served for its own sake and less as an 
instrument for the promotion of order. In other words, a shot of legalism 
is the correct medicine to reduce police misconduct that pierces the 
law’s protections of citizen freedom. 
The Article begins by distinguishing law and order as goals of 
the police and by introducing the concept of a spectrum between 
legalism and instrumentalism along which any department can be 
placed. The Article then switches direction—launching into a lengthy 
background section on the work of James Q. Wilson and the history of 
the order maintenance movement in policing. Although this section is 
billed as background, the interpretation of Wilson’s work is at the heart 
of the Article’s argument. 
Wilson wrote two works of great influence on the study and 
practice of American policing: his sociological book, Varieties of Police 
Behavior, and Broken Windows, a popular magazine article coauthored 
with James Kelling. Varieties of Police Behavior was an empirical work, 
albeit one built more on observations and interviews than on statistics. 
Written in a lively style, the book is full of candid understanding about 
ISSUE 19:2 FALL 2014 
114 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 19:2 
policing, including the insight that the work of the police has always 
been not simply about law enforcement, but about maintaining social 
order as well. Written years later, Broken Windows was an advisory 
piece for a lay audience. Wilson argued that police should concentrate 
on order maintenance in order to solve problems of urban crime and 
decay. Essentially, the Broken Windows article embodied normative 
conclusions that Wilson drew from his observations in Varieties of 
Police Behavior. 
My work in this Article represents a normative path not taken 
from the threshold of Varieties of Police Behavior. In Section I, I offer 
important background information, using the idea of a spectrum between 
legalism and instrumentalism to present a novel reading of the literature 
on order maintenance policing. With this foundation established, Section 
II presents prescriptions for policing that differ drastically from 
Wilson’s own. In Section III, I support those prescriptions with two 
reasons to believe that increased legalism will reduce civil liberties-
related misconduct: (1) officers will be more averse to breaking the law 
themselves and (2) a lid is placed on police aggression by imposing a 
more limited conception of what is properly a police matter. Finally, 
Section IV revisits the Article’s relationship to Wilson’s work and 
concludes with a bookend summary. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Distinguishing Law and Order as Objectives of the Police 
We take it for granted that the mission of the police is to uphold 
“law and order.” The phrase itself is so common as to have become 
idiomatic: it is used to describe the style of every fresh mayoral 
candidate who vows to “clean up the streets” and to “get tough on 
crime.” Through such usage, the two concepts denoted by the 
component nouns are obscured and conflated. “Law” and “order” are 
two distinct ideas and two distinct goals that a police department might 
possess. 
A society is lawful where its people conform their conduct to the 
law. We have evidence of a lawful society where, on a little-trafficked 
German street, the pedestrians wait for a signal to cross at the 
intersection. The law prohibits jaywalking, and a high level of 
compliance with its dictates is observed. Now imagine the same street in 
which the pedestrians are all waiting for the signal, but when the walk 
sign appears, some begin to skip, others cartwheel, and a few couples 
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grab hold of each other and tango across the intersection. Assuming that 
it is not against the law to practice ballroom dance in a public way, all of 
these people are acting in conformity with the law. Again, we have 
evidence of a lawful society, but not necessarily an orderly society. It is 
disorderly because the pedestrians’ conduct is unpatterned and irregular. 
Further, consider Rio de Janeiro during Carnival. The crowds of 
revelers are anything but orderly. There is little regularity or 
predictability to their conduct. At the same time, while I do not doubt 
that the festival is plagued with a regrettable share of crime, this disorder 
is not in principle incompatible with a high degree of lawfulness. If one 
imagines that the people of Rio live under a liberal legal regime, then the 
chaos per se is not unlawful. 
A society can also be orderly without being lawful. A lynch mob 
is usually a chaotic affair, but there may have been cases (and we can 
certainly envision the cases) where lynching proceeded in a structured, 
systematic fashion. For example, the authorities may habitually permit 
an organized group of citizens to take prisoners from their custody. In 
this scenario, extralegal killing proceeds in an orderly manner. Consider 
as well the apocryphal notion that the trains ran on time in Mussolini’s 
Italy. This regularity is the hallmark of an orderly society, and yet, we 
would be wrong to say that fascist Italy was a lawful society. Quite the 
opposite, it was exceedingly lawless since state fiat and party repression 
had displaced the rule of law. 
Police help society by maintaining both law and order. When a 
police officer tickets a speeder or arrests a robber, she advances law by 
both correcting the conduct of the individual and deterring other 
violators. It is also plausible to say that a society is more lawful when 
those who break the law are punished as the law prescribes. As for 
order, a police officer supports it both when she is enforcing the law and 
when she is not. In the latter category, think of a police officer directing 
traffic around the arena after a basketball game. For the former category, 
consider a police officer warning or ticketing a driver who is trying to 
bypass traffic by traveling in the highway shoulder. Driving on the 
shoulder may be unlawful, but it is also highly disorderly. The officer 
who disciplines the driver combats both failures. 
An executive organization charged with responsibility for 
enforcing a body of law, like the police, may usefully be described in 
terms of its attitude towards the law that it enforces. Organizations can 
be situated along a spectrum. At one terminal is an instrumental attitude 
toward law, where law is viewed as a means to the achievement of a 
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collateral policy goal. At the other terminal is a legalistic attitude, where 
law is viewed as an end in itself. For the police, having an instrumental 
attitude means that the law is of importance only to the extent that it 
serves or constrains the pursuit of their collateral policy goal. This could 
be order, as we have been discussing, or perhaps safety. The collateral 
policy goal will vary depending on the organization. Just like the police 
are concerned with both law and order, an administrative agency like the 
EPA is concerned with both upholding the law (the Clean Air Act, the 
Clean Water Act, etc.) and promoting human health. Hypothetically, if 
the EPA fell at the instrumental end of the spectrum, it would regard the 
statutes in its bailiwick as simply either tools or obstacles to achieving 
its goal of protecting human health. 
B. James Q. Wilson: Police Styles and Broken Windows 
1. The Concept of Police Style 
James Q. Wilson, a Harvard sociologist, wrote the classic 
empirical work on the differences in how police in diverse departments 
do their jobs.1 Wilson and his assistants studied the work of police in 
eight cities, utilizing some statistics compiled from departmental data 
but primarily relying on a large collection of anecdotes and observations 
developed by observing and interviewing citizens and officers in the 
communities studied.2 In his work, Wilson  concluded that the 
departments he studied could be described as having one of three styles: 
Watchman, Legalistic, and Service. 
I will contend that Wilson’s Watchman and Legalistic styles 
map interestingly onto the spectrum between legalism and 
instrumentalism I describe. Before I explain, however, I will say more 
about Wilson’s concept of a police style. 
What Wilson calls “police style” is an organizational 
phenomenon dictated by the administrator of the department.3 The 
differences between departments that make for a style are “animate[d] 
and sustaine[d]” by “departmental polices and organizational codes,” 
and these are matters typically under the control of the police chief, as 
opposed to even the chief’s formal superiors in the city administration.4 
Significantly, to say that an individual officer holds to the Legalistic 
 1  JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968). 
 2  See id. at 13–14 (describing methodology). 
 3  See id. at 83, 179–80. 
 4  Id. at 83; see also id. at 179–80, 227–28, 232–33. 
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style or the Watchman style would be a misappropriation of terms: 
Wilson’s concept of style pertains to departments and not to 
individuals.5 However, style does manifest in the behavior of officers, 
and more specifically, in the way they handle the significant discretion 
vested in them.6 Examples of use of discretion to which Wilson paid 
particular attention were: inter alia, treatment of juveniles, issuance of 
parking tickets, and response to drunks. In these situations, police can 
often choose among arresting, intervening informally, or ignoring the 
behavior.7 What choice the officers of a department tend to make in 
certain situations is a function of the department’s style.8 
Note that, implicit in Wilson’s reasoning, is the idea that 
organizational policy set at the top is capable of influencing officer 
behavior on the streets in the ways Wilson associates with style. The 
exact relationship between formal policy decisions and officer conduct 
is a significant question, and the reader would be right to wonder 
whether the connections asserted by Wilson hold true. At least one 
scholar has undertaken additional quantitative research in an effort to 
validate the position of Varieties of Police Behavior. To wit, Jeffrey 
Slovak sought to test the claim that organizational-level variables were 
determinants of patterns of officer activity.9 Relying on data derived 
from police dispatch logs, Slovak discovered that Wilson’s model 
largely held true.10 Even when compared to the particular urban 
environment in which a department operates, Slovak found that internal, 
organizational dynamics were the principal drivers of how proactive and 
how legalistic officers were in carrying on their work.11  As summarized 
in his conclusions, “There is relatively little of situational determinism 
here, but relatively much of pragmatic, rational, organizationally chosen 
action.”12 
More broadly, belief in the efficacy of administrative factors is 
 5  See id. at 179–80. 
 6  See id. at 83 (introducing a chapter on discretion and its measurement that is the 
basis for Wilson’s generalizations about style). 
 7  See id. at 84. 
 8  See id. at 138–39 (“The police administrator must decide what steps he will take to 
affect the way in which his officers use the discretion they have in the four cases 
described in this chapter.”). 
 9  See JEFFREY S. SLOVAK, STYLES OF URBAN POLICING 11–14 (1986). 
 10  See id. at 12–14 (outlining the research project). 
 11  Id. at 170. 
 12  Id. (emphasis added). 
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supported by general research in the theory of organizations.13 This is 
the conclusion of Barbarba Armacost, a policing scholar, in her review 
of the literature. Armacost relies in large measure on the work of V. Lee 
Hamilton and Joseph Sanders, who both argued that institutional roles 
strongly shape the perceptions and decisions of individual actors placed 
in those roles, at least insofar as the individuals do not rebel against the 
authority above them.14 The result is the substitution of the individual’s 
preferred mode of analyzing a problem with that dictated by her 
institutional position.15 As Armacost summarizes, “The key insight here 
is that individuals who are embedded in organizations do not make 
choices solely as individuals.”16 
Police style as an organizational phenomenon can be 
distinguished from the thinking of individual police officers about their 
work. Indeed, Wilson claimed that the views police express about their 
work are largely the same regardless of the style of their department.17 
In every department, the administrators “devise the policies, manipulate 
the rewards and sanctions that get them carried out, and reflect on their 
justification.”18 Patrolmen, on the other hand, are always busy with the 
tasks before them: “making runs, stopping cars, filling out forms, and 
putting up with citizen behavior that is tedious, bizarre or even 
dangerous.”19 When they do reflect about their jobs, their views are the 
same regardless of whether they are in Watchman or Legalistic 
departments.20 
The commonalities amongst officers that Wilson observed are 
what Armacost would call “occupational culture” as opposed to 
“organizational culture.”21 Her characterization of occupational culture 
is cognate with Wilson’s thinking. Like him, she traces the uniformities 
that constitute police occupational culture to a shared quotidian of 
mundane and stressful tasks. To use her words, occupational culture “is 
 13  See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 507–10 (2004). 
 14  Id. at 508 (citing V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Responsibility and Risk in 
Organizational Crimes of Obedience, 14 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 49, 57, 63 (1992)). 
 15  Id. (citing Hamilton & Sanders, supra note 14, at 49, 57). 
 16  Id. at 509 (alteration in original) (quoting Hamilton & Sanders, supra note 14, at 
66). 
 17  WILSON, supra note 1, at 179–80. 
 18  Id. at 179. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. at 179–80. 
 21  Armacost, supra note 13, at 494. 
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created by the kind of work that law enforcement officers do.”22 On the 
other hand, what Armacost refers to as “organizational culture” differs 
from department to department and aligns conceptually with police 
style.23 In sum, whilst police may possess a uniform occupational 
culture, individual departments vary in their organizational culture, viz., 
their police style, and on Wilson’s model, it is the “police administrators 
[who] effect the difference between these police styles.”24 
2. The Watchman and Legalistic Styles 
Wilson’s Watchman and Legalistic styles are of special interest 
for the contrast their juxtaposition illustrates between instrumental and 
legalistic attitudes toward the law. As the following summaries of each 
style aim to show, the Watchman style embodies an attitude towards the 
law falling on the instrumental side of the spectrum, while the Legalistic 
style, unsurprisingly, exemplifies an attitude resting nearer the legalistic 
end. It should be recognized at the outset though that the concept of a 
spectrum between instrumentalism and legalism that I introduce in this 
Article is distinct from Wilson’s notion of police style. As such, not all 
of the features that Wilson attributes to Watchman or Legalistic 
departments necessarily pertain to a department on the instrumental or 
legalistic side of the spectrum. 
It is a basic assumption of the Watchman style that police need 
not be preoccupied with enforcing the law. In light of the fact that “law 
enforcement” is now a common synonym for “police,” this may seem 
counterintuitive to the contemporary reader. Wilson writes, “In some 
communities, the police in dealing with situations that do not involve 
‘serious’ crime act as if order maintenance rather than law enforcement 
were their principal function.”25 To be sure, the police in these 
communities are not unconcerned with enforcing the law; where they 
can apprehend the perpetrator, policemen in Watchman departments can 
be counted on to arrest, book, and jail bank robbers or murderers.26 Yet 
 22  Id. at 494. 
 23  Id. (“[O]rganizational culture [means] the formal and informal values, norms, and 
ideas that characterize and define a particular institution, for example, a particular 
police agency such as the LAPD.”) (citing Robert W. Worden, The Causes of Police 
Brutality, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF 
FORCE 23, 28–31 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996)). 
 24  WILSON, supra note 1, at 180. 
 25  Id. at 140. 
 26  See id. at 141 (“Serious crimes, of course, should be dealt with seriously.”). 
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notwithstanding, there are many cases where an officer in a Watchman 
department will choose to ignore illegality or handle it without taking 
the formal step of arresting a citizen or issuing a citation.27 Equally true, 
there are cases when such an officer acts to fix a problem that the law 
considers minor, does not deem a problem at all, or at least would not 
consider a problem were it in a more reformed, rigorous condition.28 
However counterintuitive the above description of a police 
department may be, the Watchman style is the older tradition in 
American policing. Early American police in cities like Boston were 
first and foremost watchmen, part-time workers hired to “keep the 
streets clear of obstructions, human and material, and to supervise a 
number of ordinances pertaining to health, lighting, and animals running 
loose.”29 The crimes they dealt with were matters like “[v]agabondage, 
raucous behavior, public lewdness, and street fights.”30 What we might 
think of as “real crime” was left up to private redress: victimized citizens 
who could identify a thief or attacker could initiate prosecution by 
applying for a warrant and paying an officer of the court, the constable, 
to serve it for a fee.31 As Wilson tells us, “As late as 1863, a Boston 
alderman, the aristocratic Thomas Coffin Armory . . . proclaimed: ‘It is 
the duty of the police officer to serve . . . warrants, when directed to him. 
It is nowhere made his duty to initiate prosecutions.’”32 
Wilson’s Watchman departments remain true to this tradition in 
three respects: a focus on order, relative passivity, and lack of 
professionalization. To carry out his order maintenance role, “the 
patrolman is expected to ignore the ‘little stuff’ but to ‘be tough’ where 
it is important.”33 For instance, a brawling, unruly, or drunken adult is 
 27  See, e.g., id. (“Juveniles are ‘expected’ to misbehave, and thus infractions among 
this group—unless they are serious or committed by a ‘wise guy’—are best ignored or 
treated informally.”). 
 28  See, e.g., id. at 142 (listing “creating a disturbance in a restaurant, bothering passers-
by on a sidewalk, [and]  insulting an officer” as instances where an “officer is expected 
to restore order”). The oblique reference to law “in a more rigorous, reformed 
condition” is meant to capture the fact that, in the absence of vague laws against 
“crimes” like disorderly conduct, vagrancy, or public intoxication—that is to say laws 
that the police can use as handy catchalls for disfavored conduct—much behavior 
subject to police control and sanction in a Watchman department would not be 
colorably unlawful conduct at all. 
 29  Id. (citing ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON, 1822–1885 (1967)). 
 30  Id. (citing LANE, supra note 29). 
 31  Id. (citing LANE, supra note 29). 
 32  Id. at 143 (second alteration in original) (quoting LANE, supra note 29, at 130). 
 33  Id. at 145. 
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more likely to be taken home or “pacified on the scene” than he is to be 
arrested.34 Similarly, certain minor infractions by juveniles are simply 
ignored altogether, while those the police feel they cannot ignore are 
handled without arrest via the “administ[ration] of a swift kick or a 
verbal rebuke, hav[ing] the boy do some chores . . . or turn[ing] him 
over to his parents for discipline.”35 However, sometimes extralegal 
solutions to problems of order are less merciful. A high-ranking officer 
in a Watchman department explained to Wilson’s interviewer that the 
police were “‘pretty tough on vagrants here,’” that they treat such 
persons to “‘summary justice and send them to jail,’” where they 
“‘rough ‘em up a bit and then . . . send them out of town.’”36 Wilson 
makes explicit what these patterns of behavior bespeak about how a 
Watchman-like department regards the law: 
 
[T]he penal law is a device empowering the police to maintain 
order and protect others when a serious infraction has occurred; 
the exact charge brought against the person is not so important—
or rather, it is important mostly in terms of the extent to which 
that particular section of the law facilitates the uncomplicated 
exercise of police power and increases the probability of the 
court sustaining the action.37 
 
Police in Watchman departments are relatively passive in that 
they typically do not proactively pursue criminals but instead respond to 
disturbances as they occur or act to apprehend serious criminals only as 
they come to the attention of the police.38 Officers follow the path of 
least resistance, which means minimizing confrontations with the 
public.39 As Slovak later explained, the Watchman style is all about 
“keeping a lid on things.”40 Relatedly, the police in Wilson’s Watchman 
departments tended to be poorly paid and underprofessionalized.41 
Patrolmen usually did not have more than a high school education and 
received such meager wages that they were expected to maintain second 
 34  Id. at 146. 
 35  Id. at 145. 
 36  Id. at 147. 
 37  Id. at 144–45. 
 38  See id. at 144, 148 (“[T]he task of the police is to be ready for a serious crime or to 
restore order.”). 
 39  Id. at 144. 
 40  SLOVAK, supra note 9, at 112. 
 41  WILSON, supra note 1, at 151–58. 
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jobs.42 Training was also quite limited, and there was a dearth of written 
rules, records, and standardized procedures.43 
Ultimately, these last two characteristics of the Watchman 
department, passivity and underprofessionalization, are not important to 
my thesis insofar as they do not bear on where a department stands on 
the instrumental–legalistic spectrum. I present them to the reader to give 
the flavor of a Watchman department and so that he or she will not 
confuse and conflate the Watchman departments of the 1960s with the 
modern order maintenance departments to which they will be compared 
as the Article continues. 
If the Watchman departments harkened back to the early days of 
American policing, then the Legalistic departments Wilson studied were 
oriented to the future. At the time of Wilson’s study, the Legalistic 
approach was associated with reform and change.44 As such, in addition 
to their characteristic focus on law enforcement rather than order 
maintenance, Legalistic departments exhibited a refined professionalism 
and a systematic, proactive approach to the business of policing. 
Legalistic departments are much more systematic and 
professional in their approach to their work than their Watchman 
counterparts. Under a Legalistic regime, precinct stations are abolished 
and replaced with a centralized headquarters, new specialized 
departments are instituted (including departments dedicated to research 
and planning and internal affairs), training requirements are magnified, 
and the individual officer is expected to cope with a  barrage of new 
reports and paperwork.45 “A patrolman driving a beat in Oakland [a 
Legalistic city] carries with him a fat briefcase filled with forms and 
notebooks on which he records every kind of investigation, complaint, 
report, and ‘field interrogation.’”46 A premium is also placed on 
attracting college educated recruits, using the latest technology, and 
achieving a technical, bureaucratic efficiency.47 A result of all this 
standardization and systematization is that the police leadership can 
effectively reorient the police to be more aggressive in enforcing the 
law.48 Police are expected to be highly energetic in responding to citizen 
 42  Id. at 151. 
 43  Id. at 154. 
 44  See id. at 172–73. 
 45  Id. at 184. 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. at 185, 187. 
 48  See id. at 85–89, 183–84, 185–86, 190–91; SLOVAK, supra note 9, at 111–13 
 
ISSUE 19:2 FALL 2014 
2014  BREAKING LAWS TO FIX BROKEN WINDOWS 123 
reports of unlawful activity and highly proactive themselves in arresting 
observed violators, even where no one is complaining about the illicit 
happenings.49 
True to its name, a Legalistic department presents a preference 
for arrests and tickets and a tendency to treat the law as the sine qua non 
of what is a police matter. “[T]he police administrator uses such control 
as he has over the patrolmen’s behavior to induce them to handle 
commonplace situations as if they were matters of law enforcement 
rather than order maintenance.”50 This means that a high rate of traffic 
tickets will be issued, a higher proportion of juvenile offenders will be 
bureaucratically processed and arrested, vice will be hounded, and a 
large number of arrests for misdemeanors will be made, “even when, as 
with petty larceny, the public order has not been breached.”51 According 
to Wilson, this stepped up enforcement will often be experienced by 
those on whom it falls—”juveniles, Negroes, drunks, and the like”—as 
harassment.52 Indeed, emphasis on law enforcement may bring the 
police to bother even the more powerful, “decent” members of the 
community. For example, one Legalistic chief sent a letter to local 
business owners to complain that they were letting youths buy and 
smoke cigarettes at their stores in violation of Illinois law.53 On the 
other hand, a businessman committing no crime can feel safe in even a 
disreputable enterprise: “drug-store pornography,” Wilson tells us, “is 
pretty much left alone” since “the law affords few grounds for an 
arrest.”54 The phenomena of forbearance in one case and activity in the 
other are two sides of the same coin. This is illustrated by the following 
quote from an interviewed sergeant: “‘It’s Chief X’s philosophy that the 
case is either unfounded or you had better have charged them with the 
offense which they are suspected of having committed . . . . Either 
there’s no trouble and no reason to stop them or else you had better 
bring them in.’”55 
Perhaps most strikingly, Wilson found that “the police in a 
(emphasizing the association of the Legalistic style with aggressive, proactive policing). 
 49  See WILSON, supra note 1, at 173–74 (describing arrests of prostitutes and an 
insistence on prosecuting bad-check passers even when the merchant–victim has no 
interest in doing so). 
 50  Id. at 172. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. at 180. 
 54  Id. at 174. 
 55  Id. at 177. 
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legalistic city obey the law themselves.”56 Where the parking lot was 
across the street from the police headquarters, the most direct route 
would have required officers to jaywalk.57 Nevertheless, Wilson’s 
interviewers observed officers routinely walking to the corner and 
waiting for the light to cross at shift changes.58 An interviewer recorded 
a patrolman who admitted to dashing across the street “‘[o]nce or 
twice,’” but who said “‘you get used to not jaywalking, and that’s the 
way it is all the time.’”59 
3. From the Watchman Style to Broken Windows 
a. The Founding Article 
In the years that followed the publication of Varieties of Police 
Behavior, the momentum in American policing carried cities in the 
direction of Wilson’s Legalistic departments. The officer who drives his 
beat and carries a briefcase full of forms with him was the increasingly 
present future of policing. Using different terminology, Samuel Walker 
refers to this phenomenon as the “professionalism movement.”60 He 
says of it, “The reform agenda of the professionalism movement 
included expert leadership, freedom from external (especially political) 
influence, the application of the principles of modern management to 
police organizations, and elevation of personnel standards, both through 
higher entry standards and better training.”61 In observing his Legalistic 
departments, Wilson was witnessing a movement in policing that in the 
years following would become an ever more dominant paradigm for 
police chiefs.62 
More than a decade after Varieties of Police Behavior, Wilson, 
along with his Atlantic monthly co-writer, George Kelling, sounded an 
 56  Id. at 180. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice 
Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 11 
(2003). 
 61  Id. (citing SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE 
EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977) [hereinafter WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY]). 
 62  See id. (citing WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY, supra note 61) (explaining that the 
“professionalization movement emerged in the early years of the twentieth century” and 
that a popular book describing the approach became a “bible” for police chiefs  of the 
1950s through the 1970s). 
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alarm that the new model was not working.63 They thought the police 
would be more effective if patrolmen stopped driving around in cars 
acting like their only business was enforcing the penal law. Pointing to 
successes observed in New Jersey, where officers left their cars and 
returned to walking beats, Wilson and Kelling argued that policing 
needed a renewed focus on order maintenance.64 In significant measure, 
this meant a return to behaviors typical of Wilson’s Watchman 
departments. By cracking down on sources of disorder—”disreputable 
or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, 
rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, and the mentally disturbed”—
police on foot could make neighborhoods safer.65 This was both because 
such urban ills were themselves a significant source of fear and distress 
for city dwellers and because the disorder was criminogenic.66 
In sum, disorderly behavior—low-level crime and non-crime—
was not just unsightly, unpleasant, and frightful, but it was a cause of 
more serious, violent crime.67 Wilson and Kelling explain, “Social 
psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a 
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will 
soon be broken.”68 Per the same principle, a neighborhood that is 
plagued with vandalism, prostitution, obstreperous drunks, rowdy 
youths, unstable homeless persons, or aggressive panhandlers is a 
neighborhood ripe for a rise in more serious crimes. What has happened 
in such a neighborhood is a breakdown of community order, of the 
informal social controls that ordinarily keep drunks from bothering 
“decent” people and brazen teenagers from menacing those who pass by 
“their” corner.69 When these social controls disappear, people of the 
neighborhood are no longer “confident they can regulate public behavior 
by informal controls.”70 Consequently, the area becomes a place where 
drugs are sold and cars are stripped, a place where the drunks who 
congregate are “rolled” by rowdy juveniles, the johns who visit the 
prostitutes are targeted for robbery, and anyone outside is at risk of 
 63  James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Mar. 1982, at 29. 
 64  Id. at 29–30. 
 65  Id. at 30. 
 66  Id. at 31. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. at 31–32. 
 70  Id. at 32. 
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being mugged.71 
Police can preempt this vicious circle only if they return to 
certain behaviors characteristic of the Watchman style. Kelling walked 
the streets with a Newark foot-patrolman named Kelly and discovered 
how Kelly’s Watchman-like use of authority reinforced community 
norms that might otherwise break down.72 The standards in question 
were, of course, not legal norms but norms recognized by the “regulars” 
in the neighborhood, a category that included both “decent folks” and 
those familiar local drunks and derelicts who accepted the rules.73 Kelly 
and the regulars were well-acquainted with each other and with the 
standards that he aimed to enforce: 
 
Drunks and addicts could sit on the stoops, but could not lie 
down. Talking to, bothering, or begging from people waiting at 
the bus stop was strictly forbidden. If a dispute erupted between 
a businessman and a customer, the businessman was assumed to 
be right, especially if the customer was a stranger. If a stranger 
loitered, Kelly would ask him if he had any means of support 
and what his business was; if he gave unsatisfactory answers, he 
was sent on his way. Persons who broke the informal rules, 
especially those who bothered people waiting at bus stops, were 
arrested for vagrancy. Noisy teenagers were told to keep quiet.74 
 
Kelly was not the sole author of these rules; their creation was a joint 
project with the regulars.75 When someone broke the rules, residents 
turned to him to restore order and assisted by heaping ridicule on 
violators.76 Moreover, like the policemen of Wilson’s Watchman 
departments, Kelly’s methods of restoring order frequently strayed 
outside the bounds of the law.77 As the authors described his methods, 
“Some of the things he did probably would not withstand legal 
challenge.”78 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. at 30–31. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. at 30. 
 75  Id. at 30–31. 
 76  Id. 
 77  See id. 
 78  Id. at 31. 
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b. Broken Windows in Vogue 
Today, the theory that disorder begets crime is so associated 
with Wilson and Kelling’s metaphor that the phrase “broken windows” 
is roughly synonymous with order maintenance approaches to policing. 
It is equally true that no city is more identified with “broken windows 
theory” than New York City. As documented by Kelling himself (this 
time with Catherine Coles as his writing partner), the 1990s New York 
Police Department responded to high crime and spotty quality of life 
with order maintenance rather than law enforcement.79 The chief 
protagonists in the struggle were Mayor Rudy Giuliani, Police 
Commissioner Raymond Kelly, and his successor, William Bratton.80 
Under their watch, victories were achieved against squeegeeing, graffiti, 
and aggressive panhandling81—the kinds of urban ills that Wilson and 
Kelling had found so baleful when left uncontrolled. Though Kelling 
and Coles were writing in 1996, a relatively early point in this 
campaign,82 they could already point to statistics showing a declining 
crime rate in the City.83 They linked that evidence to the new broken 
windows approach.84 
Bernard Harcourt, a critic of the New York policies that Kelling 
and Coles laud, documents the large increase in both misdemeanor 
arrests and use of “stop-and-frisk” that accompanied the NYPD’s order 
maintenance push.85 Despite the fact that the number of misdemeanor 
complaints remained static, the number of misdemeanor arrests in New 
York City jumped by over fifty percent in the three years between 1993 
and 1996,86 the period Kelling and Coles associate with the turn to order 
maintenance. At the same time, the NYPD greatly expanded its use of 
stop-and-frisk,87 a tactic of stopping, questioning, and sometimes patting 
down citizens in public places. The tactic purports to use investigatory 
 79  GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS 137–56 
(1996). 
 80  See id. at 141, 143. 
 81  Id. at 141, 149. 
 82  See id. at 141–43 (describing the 1993 anti-squeegeeing campaign as “The First 
NYPD Success”).  
 83  Id. at 151–56. 
 84  Id. 
 85  BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING 10 (2001). 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
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authority recognized by Terry v. Ohio88 and New York statute,89 both of 
which permit officers to stop individuals in public on reasonable 
suspicion of criminality and to conduct a limited search for weapons 
(“frisk” or “Terry pat”) where a reasonable suspicion exists that the 
detained individual is armed and dangerous. 
Just like the routing of the squeegee men, the increase in 
misdemeanor arrests and use of stop-and-frisk is in keeping with Wilson 
and Kelling’s order maintenance theories. The penal law, they originally 
noted, lists offenses that can be used as tools for police in their efforts to 
keep order, independent of their significance as laws to be enforced for 
their own sake.90 Laws against vagrancy or public drunkenness are much 
more valuable for what they enable the police to accomplish—arrest and 
summary discipline91 of a public order malefactor—than their value as 
crimes to be prosecuted.92 Unsurprisingly, when a department turns to 
order maintenance, increased figures for misdemeanor arrests are to be 
expected. In like manner, we can anticipate police will make use of their 
authority under Terry to further the aim of order. Each stop is valuable, 
not solely as an opportunity to investigate a particular crime of which 
the individual stopped was suspected, but as a general opportunity to 
assert police authority and stay in contact with citizens.93 
Looking to the foregoing, I take the contemporary NYPD to be 
characteristic of the modern order maintenance department. Indeed, it 
would be difficult not to belabor the connections between the theoretical 
approach of Wilson and Kelling and the contemporary manner of 
policing in New York City. This is not to say that the NYPD or any 
 88  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 89  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 2010).  
 90  Wilson & Kelling, supra note 63, at 35. 
 91  Harcourt describes how arduous a misdemeanor arrest can be even when the matter 
does not culminate in conviction. HARCOURT, supra note 85, at 176. He reminds us that 
arrests create a criminal record, id., that arrestees are “‘[h]andcuffed, fingerprinted and 
often strip-searched,’” id. (quoting Matthew Purdy, In New York, Handcuffs Are One-
Size-Fits-All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997, at A1), and that, per a newspaper report, 
“‘some people were held in cells for more than 60 hours waiting to see a judge for 
crimes like farebeating, sleeping on park benches, and drinking beer in public.’” Id. 
(quoting Michael Cooper, You’re Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, § 13, at 1). 
 92  See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 63, at 35. 
 93  See HARCOURT, supra note 85, at 10–11 (“The fact is, even if the quality-of-life 
initiative contributed to some degree to the decline in crime in New York City, the 
primary mechanism is probably not the broken windows theory. The primary engine is 
probably the enhanced power of surveillance offered by a policy of aggressive stops and 
frisks and misdemeanor arrests.”). 
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other modern department we might label as order maintenance 
corresponds in every particular with the model the authors propounded 
in the Atlantic Monthly. It does mean, however, that the police are 
approaching their mission in a way that comports more with a goal of 
order maintenance and less with one of law enforcement. Increased use 
of the power to arrest for misdemeanors and to stop-and-frisk are some 
tell-tale behaviors that result. 
The aroma of the old Watchman style departments stands around 
modern-day order maintenance tactics. For example, the use of minor 
misdemeanors as order maintenance tools is a theme that runs right 
through Wilson’s chapter on Watchman departments in Varieties of 
Police Behavior, to the pages of the Atlantic Monthly, and on into 
modern NYPD practice as documented by Harcourt, Kelling, and Coles. 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that a Watchman department, the 
kind of police work advocated in Broken Windows, and the modern 
NYPD are three different things. In many respects, the contemporary 
NYPD is still much more like one of Wilson’s Legalistic departments 
than it is one of his Watchman institutions. The Watchman departments 
were characterized not only by a focus on order maintenance but also by 
passivity and lack of systematization or professionalism. Legalistic 
departments, in contrast, were not just oriented towards law 
enforcement; they were also keen on using the latest technology, relying 
on detailed written rules, producing vast numbers of written reports, 
hiring the best officers, training them rigorously, and taking a proactive 
approach to doing their jobs. Without regard to the turn to order 
maintenance, I assume it to be true that today’s NYPD is like a 
Legalistic department, not a Watchman organization, in each of these 
respects.94 
c. Police Misconduct in a Broken Windows City 
During the last two decades, New York City was blessed with a 
falling crime rate, a phenomenon that some attributed to its adoption of 
 94  There is also the possibility of fragmentation in a department on the scale of the 
NYPD. Different divisions may have different police styles, a circumstance that Wilson 
himself did not recognize. In the NYPD, detectives in homicide or vice may still appear 
much like Wilson’s Oakland cops, continuing to display the expertise and law 
enforcement focus typical of the professionalism movement in the midst of the 
trumpeting of broken windows by the brass. On the other hand, certain patrol officers 
who have been restored to walking beats may exemplify the new order maintenance 
philosophy that the public has come to associate with New York policing. 
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broken windows policing.95 Observing these trends in 1996, Kelling and 
Coles believed that the drop in crime could be traced to the new police 
tactics.96 For present purposes, it suffices to say that not everyone who 
has considered the issue has reached the same conclusion. Indeed, much 
evidence casts doubt on any causal relationship between the two 
changes.97 
Apart from attacking its effectiveness at reducing crime, critics 
of the new style of policing have pointed to violations of civil liberties 
under the new policing regime. Anecdotes and statistics alike attest to 
the alarming frequency at which police infringe citizens’ rights in 
today’s New York. 
Harcourt recounts the story of Chris C., a New York man who 
was “[l]ooking for a friend’s name on the mailbox in the lobby of an 
apartment building” when he was arrested by officers who were 
“hunting for drug activity.”98 Chris was accused of trespass, 
“handcuffed, taken to jail, strip-searched, and held for nineteen hours” 
only to have his case dismissed.99 A woman named Nancy T., was 
driving in Chinatown when she was stopped and arrested “for driving 
without her license and talking back to a police officer,” or “‘failure to 
comply with an order.’”100 Nancy was also handcuffed, brought to the 
station house, strip-searched, and kept in custody until early the next 
morning.101 In another story, a middle-aged African-American woman 
was walking home from work one night.102 Noticing an out-of-place 
 95  E.g., Christina Nifong, One Man’s Theory is Cutting Crime in Urban Streets, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 18, 1997, at 1. 
 96  KELLING & COLES, supra note 79, at 151–56. 
 97  E.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from 
New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 315 (2006) 
(“Our analysis provides no empirical evidence to support the view that shifting police 
towards minor disorder offenses would improve the efficiency of police spending and 
reduce violent crime.”); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: 
Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 
2004, at 163, 186 (rejecting altered police tactics as an explanation of falling crime rates 
in the 1990s in favor of “increased incarceration, more police, the decline of crack, and 
legalized abortion”). 
 98  HARCOURT, supra note 85, at 177 (citing Purdy, supra note 91). 
 99  Id. (citing Purdy, supra note 91). 
 100  Id. (citing Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, Challenge to Authority: Disrespect as 
Catalyst for Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at A1). 
 101  Id. (citing Sontag & Barry, supra note 100). 
 102  Id. (citing ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP AND 
FRISK” PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE 
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white man in her mostly black Brooklyn neighborhood, she started to 
worry and walked faster.103 When the man caught up with her, he put his 
arm around her neck and told her to be quiet, that he was a police 
officer.104 The man forced her back to a waiting car where he and 
another officer made her put her hands on the car’s hood, frisked her, 
and “conducted a full search of her person” before they told her that she 
was free to go.105 
The picture painted by these individual narratives of police 
intrusion on civil liberties matches data compiled by the New York Civil 
Liberties Union on stop-and-frisk in New York City.106 According to a 
2012 report, the number of stops in the city more than quintupled in less 
than ten years, rising from 97,296 in 2002 to 685,724 in 2011.107 Of 
those 685,724 stops, 86.6% were black or Latino men.108 Indeed, so 
many young black men were stopped that in just one year, the number of 
such stops exceeded the number of young black men living in all of the 
five boroughs!109 Further troubling data indicated that, even though 
police are supposed to have a reasonable belief that the person they have 
stopped is armed and dangerous before conducting a frisk, 55.7% of 
persons stopped were frisked, with searches yielding a weapon only 
1.9% of the time.110 Apart from the overuse of frisks, a very large 
number of putatively innocent people are subject to stops, a fact that 
casts doubt on whether many of the stops even meet the Constitution’s 
lenient reasonable suspicion standard: “Of the 685,724 stops in 2011, 
605,328 were of people who had engaged in no unlawful behavior as 
evidenced by the fact they were not issued a summons nor arrested.”111 
This is just a sampling of the worrisome statistics from the report as it 
pertains to the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment Rights of New 
Yorkers. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 78–79 (1999)). 
 103  Id. (citing SPITZER, supra note 102, at 78–79). 
 104  Id. (citing SPITZER, supra note 102, at 78–79). 
 105  Id. (citing SPITZER, supra note 102, at 78–79). 
 106  See Stop-and-Frisk 2011: NYCLU Briefing, NYCLU (May 9, 2012), 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/ NYCLU_2011_Stop-and-Frisk_Report.pdf. 
 107  Id. at 3. 
 108  Id. at 5. 
 109  Id. at 7. 
 110  Id. at 2. 
 111  Id. at 15. 
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d. The Future of New York Policing 
This Article was written prior to the inauguration of Bill de 
Blasio as mayor of New York City and the ruling of Judge Scheindlin on 
the constituionality of stop-and-frisk in the City. References to the 
“modern” or “contemporary” New York City Police Department should 
be understood accordingly. 
While both new developments prefigure reform of stop-and-
frisk, an assessment of the changes that have taken place so far is outside 
the scope of this Article. Signficantly, whether the NYPD will retain its 
order maintenance orientation remains to be seen. That said, I am 
cautiously optimistic that the flaws in New York City policing that I 
identify here are changing for the better. 
II. THESIS 
Like the Watchman department before it, a department with an 
order maintenance orientation will fall on the instrumental side of the 
legalistic–instrumental spectrum. As the above background has shown, 
instrumentalism is all but the official motto of the order maintenance 
movement in policing. Order maintenance theories instruct the police to 
make something other than law enforcement a priority; consequently, 
the law is considered only insofar as it helps or inhibits pursuit112 of the 
collateral policy goal, i.e., order.113 We have also seen an order 
maintenance community, New York City, afflicted with police 
violations of civil liberties. In light of these facts, I contend: 
A more legalistic attitude would reduce instances of civil liberties 
violations in order maintenance departments. This is both because (1) 
officers in a more legalistic department will be more loath to disobey the 
 112  Terry is an example of law that can both help and inhibit the work of an order 
maintenance department. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). On the one hand, the 
case gives officers of the NYPD Constitutional license to implement stop-and-frisk. At 
the same time, the Terry doctrine creates limits on the use of that authority. Tactically, 
officers must be chary of these limits lest they stumble into lawsuits and public outcry 
that might embarrass the order maintenance project. Consequently, the order 
maintenance department and its officers must be attuned to Terry both as a tool and as 
an obstacle or pitfall. 
 113  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. This is not to say that law enforcement 
disappears altogether as a priority in order maintenance departments. Especially among 
certain groups of officers like detectives, law enforcement will remain a priority. Where 
a department stands on the spectrum is, of course, a matter of degree.  The claim here is 
only that adopting order maintenance will place a department closer to the instrumental 
end of the spectrum. 
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law (including the Constitution) themselves and because (2) legalism 
tempers aggressive tactics by limiting what is considered a “police 
matter.” 
When I speak of increased legalism or instrumentalism, I follow 
Wilson in treating a department’s position on the spectrum as an 
organizational variable, set by administrators, that manifests in officers’ 
behavior but not necessarily in their expressed views about their jobs.114 
Tracking Wilson in this manner allows me both to draw support from his 
findings on the significance of organizational “style” for police behavior 
and to frame my arguments in terms of critical analysis and 
redeployment of his theories. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Perils of Instrumentalism 
In this section, I aim to demonstrate how an instrumental attitude 
towards law engenders civil liberties violations by expanding the scope 
of what is considered a police matter. The basic idea is that where police 
see their role as keepers of order rather than as enforcers of the law, they 
expand the range of citizen conduct upon which they are likely to bring 
to bear their authority. The result is police intrusion on civil liberties, 
either by the use of authority against the legally innocent, or its use 
against technically guilty persons against whom the law is invoked only 
instrumentally. Insofar as the expansion of the police role is a function 
of instrumentalism, a dose of legalism would naturally diminish these 
ills. 
1. Law and Legality in Broken Windows Theory 
Wilson and Kelling openly defended order maintenance as a 
style of policing that strays outside the bounds of legality. Recall their 
description of the policeman whom Kelling accompanied on his beat, 
the one who did things that “probably would not withstand a legal 
challenge.”115 Sometimes the policeman would arrest offenders against 
neighborhood order for vagrancy, a tactic deployed against those who 
bothered people at bus stops for example.116 Other times, Kelly would 
“tak[e] informal or extralegal steps to help protect what the 
neighborhood had decided was the appropriate level of public order,” 
 114  See supra notes 3–25 and accompanying text. 
 115  Wilson & Kelling, supra note 63, at 31. 
 116  Id. 
 
ISSUE 19:2 FALL 2014 
134 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 19:2 
such as telling a loitering stranger to get lost or verbally rebuking rowdy 
teenagers.117 
Later in the article, the two admit that charges like vagrancy or 
public drunkenness possess “scarcely any legal meaning” and that they 
exist “not because society wants judges to punish vagrants or drunks but 
because it wants an officer to have the legal tools to remove undesirable 
persons from a neighborhood when informal efforts to preserve order in 
the streets have failed.” (Here, the authors allude to the long history of 
this practice, presumably with Wilson’s old Watchman departments in 
mind.)118 The authors go on to bemoan the movement to clear these 
statutes from the books.119 It is misguided, they say, to deprive police of 
the authority to make such arrests; those who contend that behavior like 
homelessness or drunkenness harms no one and therefore should not be 
criminal fail to see the substantial damages that coalesce when these 
behaviors go unchecked.120 
The bluntest description Wilson and Kelling give of police 
departing from the law in the name of order involves the Robert Taylor 
Homes, a very large and crime-plagued housing project in Chicago.121 
Although gangs were a major problem in the Robert Taylor Homes, it 
was not a crime for gangs to congregate in the halls.122 Thus, unless a 
police officer happenned to be around when a member was committing 
an offense, he or she could not use arrest as an option for handling the 
gangs.123 The police solution was to “chase known gang members out of 
the project.”124 What does it mean to chase them out? The authors quote 
an officer: “‘We kick ass.’”125 In the view of the officers, “the cops and 
the gangs are the two rival sources of power in the area, and . . . the 
gangs are not going to win.”126 
Whatever the salutary effects of the police actions that Wilson 
and Kelling advocate, these behaviors infringe civil liberties. Arresting a 
citizen for vagrancy simply to get rid of her is bound to cross 
constitutional lines. Likewise, commanding a panhandler to get out of a 
 117  Id. at 30–31. 
 118  Id. at 35. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. at 35. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. 
 126  Id. 
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neighborhood, at least when backed by force or the threat of force, is a 
use of police authority that cuts through legal boundaries. Choosing to 
“kick ass” when arrest is not an option is a response to gangs that cannot 
be reconciled with constitutional limits on police use of force. 
All of these uses of police power, and like uses to which the 
authors only allude, flow from an expanded notion of the police role. 
Regarding panhandlers, the job is keeping a bus stop orderly and 
comfortable. With a housing project, the mission is to bring order and 
safety to its halls and assert the authority of the police vis-à-vis their 
rivals, the gangs. In each case, the law takes a back seat—it finds itself 
neglected, exploited, or both. Yet, except for some serious reservations 
about the potential for stereotyping and discrimination when the police 
are given free rein,127 the authors self-consciously embrace the 
instrumental turn. 
2. Lessons from Varieties of Police Behavior 
The kind of policing featured in “Broken Windows” exhibits two 
civil liberties flaws: extra-legal violence and groundless or instrumental 
arrest. I have argued that both can be traced to an expanded notion of the 
police role, which is in turn a manifestation of instrumentalism in a 
police department. This section builds upon this argument by comparing 
the effects of instrumentalism in Wilson’s Watchman departments to the 
effects of legalism in his Legalistic departments. I will also explore 
parallels to modern order maintenance departments. 
The passivity of officers in a typical Watchman department does 
not extend to situations where the authority of the police is challenged. 
Speaking of the Albany police, Wilson wrote, “[T]here is not much 
evidence of Albany police timidity. A perceived challenge to police 
authority is met forcefully.”128 Over an eight-week period in Albany, 
there were nine persons arrested for disorderly conduct.129 In eight of 
these nine cases, the police report stated that the officer had been the 
victim of “‘abusive language’” or assaulted by the arrestee.130 Seven of 
these arrestees were black, but the eighth was a white man who, when 
 127  Id. (“The concern about equity is more serious. We might agree that certain 
behavior makes one person more undesirable than another but how do we ensure that 
age or skin color or national origin or harmless mannerisms will not also become the 
basis for distinguishing the undesirable from the desirable?”). 
 128  WILSON, supra note 1, at 166. 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. 
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witnessing the police arrest someone else, suggested the officer release 
his target: “‘Why don’t you let this man go?’”131 When the white man 
refused to “move on” at the officer’s request, he was arrested for 
disorderly conduct.132 In another case, a black man reported being taken 
to headquarters and beaten on the legs to get an apology for an alleged 
insult made to an officer.133 Wilson recognizes prior research showing 
that 37% of officers felt that the police were “‘justified in roughing a 
man up’” when “‘he show[ed] disrespect for the police.’”134 Wilson 
accepts the study’s findings with qualification: he suggests that this is 
typical of some departments, presumably Watchman organizations, but 
not others, presumably Legalistic ones.135 
Use of violence and dubious arrests against those who defy 
officers is matched by similar injuries doled out to strangers, juveniles, 
and black people. Recall officers in Watchman departments who 
administered irregular justice to juveniles with a “swift kick” or who 
beat up vagrants before throwing them out of the city.136 Likewise, black 
males in Albany interviewed by Wilson’s assistants recounted stories of 
informal police violence and insults.137 One, who admitted to having 
been involved with gangs, remembered being “hit frequently by the 
police” as a youth, but never being arrested.138 Another recounted police 
insults and racial slurs; he spoke of the frustration of not being able to 
“fight back,” presumably for fear of retaliation for challenging the 
officer’s power.139 
The above descriptions of officer conduct specifically 
demonstrate connections between abuses and an expanded police role. 
When the police act as guardians of public order rather than as neutral 
enforcers of the law, vagrants will be beaten up rather than left alone, 
raucous juveniles will be kicked rather than ignored or arrested, and 
citizens will question or oppose officers at their own peril. One must 
remember that backtalk, being a hobo, and many forms of youthful 
rowdiness are not crimes. Perhaps most significantly, the law does not 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. at 166–67. 
 133  Id. at 167. 
 134  Id. at 46 n.44 (quoting William A. Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 AM. J. SOC. 
34, 38 (1953)). 
 135  See id. at 46. 
 136  See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 137  WILSON, supra note 1, at 167. 
 138  Id. 
 139  See id. (“‘You can’t stand up and be a man here.’”). 
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define police power or police control of the streets as an end in itself. It 
follows that maintaining authority alone and for its own sake is not a 
sufficient legal basis for detention or for the use of violence. 
Nonetheless, invoking violence and arrest power in order to 
maintain control—to maintain police-sanctioned order—can be seen in 
both the old Watchman departments and in contemporary order 
maintenance departments, such as the NYPD. Harcourt quotes from an 
interview with an officer in the Bronx:  
 
[Q:] Did you beat people up who you arrested?’  
[A:] ‘No. We’d just beat people in general. If they’re on the 
street, hanging around drug locations. It was a show of force.’ 
[Q:] ‘Why were these beatings done?’  
[A:] ‘To show who was in charge. We were in charge, the 
police.’”140 
 
During last year’s court challenge to stop-and-frisk, Floyd v. City of New 
York,141 the plaintiffs introduced a recording of a Bedford-Stuyvesant 
police lieutenant instructing his officers on the importance of controlling 
the streets: 
 
So we’ve got to keep the corner clear . . . Because if you get too 
big of a crowd there, you know, . . . they’re going to think that 
they own the block. We own the block. They don’t own the 
block, all right? They might live there but we own the block. All 
right? We own the streets here. You tell them what to do.142 
 
In another parallel with the Watchman tradition, modern order 
maintenance departments utilize misdemeanor arrests as tools of social 
control. The Floyd plaintiffs introduced a recording of a Bedford 
 140  HARCOURT, supra note 85, at 167 (quoting Bob Herbert, Connect the Dots, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997, at D13). Chief Justice Warren recognized the use of stop-and-
frisk to assert police control, he wrote of occasions when “the ‘stop and frisk’ of youths 
or minority group members is ‘motivated by the officers’ perceived need to maintain 
the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating 
anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets.’” Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1968) (quoting LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY, DONALD M. MCINTYRE, JR. & 
DANIEL L. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 47–48 (1967)). 
 141  959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 142  Id. at 597 (alteration in original). 
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Stuyvesant seargeant telling his men: 
 
If you see guys walking down the street, move ‘em along. Two 
or three guys you can move, you can’t move 15, all right? If you 
want to be a[n] asshole or whatever you want to call it, make a 
move. If they won’t move, call me over and lock them up [for 
disorderly conduct]. No big deal. We could leave them there all 
night . . . The less people on the street, the easier our job will 
be.143 
 
The seargeant adds, “If they’re on a corner, make them move. They 
don’t want to move, you lock them up. Done deal. You can always 
articulate later.”144 
During a different Brooklyn recording, a deputy inspector 
instructs officers in terms that imply the identity or merit of the 
particular charge used to “articulate” why a person is arrested is 
unimportant: “Tonight is zero tolerance. . . . Everybody goes. I don’t 
care . . . . They’re throwing dice? They all go, promote gambling. I don’t 
care. Let the DA discuss what they’re going to do tomorrow.”145 Here it 
is worth noting that the commanders’ suggested uses for disorderly 
conduct and gambling charges agree with Wilson and Kelling’s defense 
of using vague misdemeanor offenses to remove public-order 
malefactors.146 
Harcourt emphasizes that the NYPD also utilitizes misdemeanor 
arrests as a tool of surveillance. He writes, “[i]n 1998 the NYPD went 
even further and began implementing a new policy of detaining anyone 
arrested for even a minor misdemeanor offense ‘until a computerized 
fingerprint check verifies the person’s identity.’”147 In like manner, 
aggressive use of stop-and-frisk achieves increased surveillance by 
giving the police an opportunity to challenge, question, and search the 
person stopped.148 
 143  Id. (alteration in original). 
 144  Id. at 598 (emphasis omitted). 
 145  Id. (second and third alterations in original). 
 146  See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. 
 147  HARCOURT, supra note 85, at 176 (quoting David Kocieniewski & Michael Cooper, 
New York Tightens Scrutiny of All Suspects Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998, at 
A1).  
 148  See id. at 11 (speaking of the “power of surveillance offered by a policy of 
aggressive stops and frisks and misdemeanor arrests”). Harcourt actually claims that 
insofar as remodeled police tactics have contributed to crime reduction in New York 
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According to Wilson, police in Legalistic departments take a 
more restricted view of their job that is consistent with the law 
enforcement orientation of the department. Notably, Wilson does not 
associate police in Legalistic departments with extra-legal violence or 
with efforts to punish those who challenge an officer’s authority.149 At 
the same time, while a focus on law enforcement may cause patrolmen 
to be less merciful than they otherwise might be,150 it also encourages 
them to leave alone those who are not breaking the law. Wilson quotes a 
sergeant in a Legalistic city: 
 
It’s Chief X’s philosophy that the case is either unfounded or 
you had better have charged them with the offense which they 
are suspected of having committed. When we come across a 
group of kids scuffling after a basketball game, there’s no such 
thing as ‘messing around’ in his eyes. Either there’s no trouble 
and no reason to stop them or else you had better bring them 
in.151 
 
Notice how the binary the sergeant describes excludes options an 
officer in a Watchman or order maintenance department might take. 
Either a crime is being committed and an arrest must be made, or no 
violation has occurred and the young people must be left to themselves. 
In neither case is it acceptable for a patrolman to intervene in an 
informal manner only—for instance, by ordering the teenagers to 
disperse or whacking one in the stomach. Moreover, it is tacitly assumed 
inappropriate to make an arrest for an “unfounded” case. It is true that 
the Legalistic result is presumably harsher where the law is infringed: a 
weekend in jail can be worse than a smack with a baton, and a violator 
would certainly prefer the Watchman cop who ignores the offense to the 
zealous Legalistic officer. At the same time, where the law is not being 
broken, there is neither official violence nor a dubious arrest. In other 
words, we experience an outcome more consistent with civil liberties. 
City that it is increased surveillance, not the broken windows theory that explains 
things. Id. at 10–11. 
 149  See supra notes 128–35 and accompanying text. 
 150  Recall that Legalism is associated with proactive policing and increased arrest rates. 
See supra note 52 and accompanying text. I address the tension between the 
aggressiveness of Legalistic departments and the improved climate for civil liberties I 
attribute to increased legalism in a section at the end of the Article. 
 151  WILSON, supra note 1, at 177. 
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B. Some Surprising Fruit of Legalism 
Speaking of the administrators in Legalistic departments, Wilson 
writes, “To some degree they demand that their officers enforce the laws 
because they believe it is right that all laws be enforced.”152 Wilson 
supports this statement with the example of the chief who admonished 
local businessmen about selling cigarettes to teenagers and the story of 
the Oakland Police Department’s letter to parents that promised to cite 
their children if they failed to comply with a bicycle registration law.153 
Wilson also mentions other reasons for enforcement: he points to 
administrators’ desires to avoid corruption, a wish to remove the police 
from the political realm, and a hope that rigorously enforcing the law 
will achieve larger social objectives.154 
Further supporting his contention that the administration in a 
Legalistic department believes in the enforcement of all laws, Wilson 
flatly declares, “[T]he police in a legalistic city obey the law 
themselves.”155 This is how Wilson introduces his example of the 
officers in a Legalistic city who would not jaywalk from headquarters to 
the parking lot.156 Admittedly, this is a small point in Wilson’s 
analysis—a regrettable reality when one considers what an intriguing 
proposition it is. Wilson provides no other clear-cut instances of the 
phenomenon, although other rough examples can be found in different 
contexts. 
One such rough example is the fact that “drug-store 
pornography” is safe in Legalistic cities.157 This may bespeak officers’ 
leeriness about breaking the law. One imagines an officer who 
remembers, not only that interfering with the lawful vending of 
pornographic books is outside her purview, but also that she would be 
breaking the law herself if she were to seize them. The point generalizes 
to other instances in which an officer in a Legalistic department refrains 
 152  Id. at 180. 
 153  Id. The step-up in enforcement of the registration ordinance was a response to the 
difficulty of solving bicycle thefts. Id. 
 154  Id. at 180–81. Mention of larger social objectives tends to call into question the 
legalism of the Legalistic departments, suggesting as it does an instrumental attitude 
towards the law. I contend that even where it is hoped that larger social objectives will 
be fulfilled by rigid enforcement of the law, a department may still be legalistic as 
opposed to instrumental in its attitude towards the law. This issue is discussed at length 
in the next section.  
 155  Id. at 180. 
 156  See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 157  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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from an extralegal use of his or her power. Recall the statement of the 
sergeant about encountering youths scuffling after a basketball game.158 
An arrest was ruled out in those situations where the charge would be 
unfounded. Again, this could simply be because the scene presents no 
law enforcement matter or because any arrest would itself be unlawful. 
I want to emphasize two conceptual points at this juncture. The 
first, already discussed at the Article’s outset, is that law and order are 
separate police missions. Once the meaning of each is separated from 
the “law and order” idiom, one can see that police achievement of one is 
severable from the other. A department like the NYPD may make 
society more orderly at the expense of law. Police action that advances 
order while violating the law renders society ceteris paribus, less lawful. 
The second point is that the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the rest of the Constitution are just as much law as the 
penal code is law. The corollary is that every warrantless search of a 
home is just as much a deviation from the law as every act of 
shoplifting.159 To further accentuate the point, though New York City 
may be a much safer, more orderly city than it was twenty years ago,  it 
may also be a less lawful city if the exploding numbers of stops and 
frisks include a substantial portion of actions based on racial profiling or 
conducted without reasonable suspicion.160 Viewed in the above light, it 
appears self-evident that a police department that treats the law more as 
an end and less as a means will seek to reduce its own contribution to 
illegality by limiting civil liberties violations by its officers. 
Conceptual intuitions aside, the reader is right to be skeptical of 
the claim that a legalistic attitude in a department entails that officers 
will be more circumspect regarding citizens’ rights. In particular, one 
can accept Wilson’s evidence that officers in his Legalistic departments 
were loath to jaywalk or commit other crimes accessible to private 
citizens without thereby accepting that this antipathy to breaking the law 
extended to constitutional matters encountered in the course of pursuing 
 158  See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 159  Insofar as constitutions are special, foundational law, the former may be even more 
significant from the perspective of legality. 
 160  Compare Harcourt’s comments on Wilson and Kelling: “On close inspection, the 
desired order depends on a lot of disorder, irregularity, and brutality.” HARCOURT, 
supra note 85, at 127. “But in fact, irregularity is central to their [Wilson and Kelling’s] 
analysis, because it is precisely the application of universal rules that most clearly 
undermines the order-maintenance function.” Id. at 128. “In effect, regularity on the 
street depends on irregularity in police practice—mixed, of course, with some regularity 
in the choice of suspects.” Id. at 129. 
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crime. On this point, my argument calls for more evidence than 
Wilson’s book (and my critical reinterpretation of it) can yield. 
The assumption that illegality in the course of policing is 
somehow different is also the target of an article by Bennett Capers. 
Capers writes about how police lose legitimacy in the eyes of the 
community when officer infractions go unrecognized and unpunished.161 
He criticizes the double standard perceived by members of minority 
communities. Community members see that “they [the police] are our 
designated enforcers of the law, but too often function outside of the law 
themselves.”162 Such behavior erodes the willingness of people in these 
communities to support the police and obey the law themselves.163 
Focusing on perjury by officers, Capers argues for far more 
investigations and prosecutions of officers who lie under oath.164 This 
remedy is superior to internal, administrative discipline or fines because 
it treats the perjuring officer the same as the perjuring civilian.165 In this 
way, it strikes a blow against the double standard at a point where the 
standard is weak: it punishes violations of a clear-cut, uncontrovertially 
bad crime as opposed to violations of a vague and politically contested 
constitutional standard.166 
I agree with Capers, especially with his elucidation of the 
problem of a double standard. Capers’ choice of perjury as the place to 
initiate reform is particularly interesting. Previously, I worried that 
Wilson’s flat claim—“the police in a legalistic city obey the law 
themselves”—might not embrace law violations connected to the work 
of law enforcement itself, e.g., excessive use of force or bogus searches. 
Perjury is a curious case as such because it is both a crime that civilians 
can commit and a crime committed in relation to a police officer’s on-
duty tasks. Moreover, as Capers notes, it is a relatively unambiguous 
offense. If Wilson is correct that police in his Legalistic departments 
obey the law themselves, then his theory would predict reduced rates of 
perjury by officers testifying about their work. On the other hand, if this 
were found not to be the case, it would cast doubt on Wilson’s claim that 
 161  Bennett Capers, Crime Legitimacy and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835 (2008). 
 162  Id. at 837. 
 163  Id. at 865. 
 164  Id. at 873. 
 165  Id. at 872. 
 166  See id. at 867 (“[I]t may be difficult to build consensus around curbing excessive 
force, profiling, or under-enforcement on the streets. Testilying, by contrast, tends to be 
more uniformly condemned.”). 
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a law enforcement orientation imposed by the brass engenders general 
habits of compliance with the law in a department’s lower ranks. The 
claim would then have to be qualified so as to distinguish cases like 
jaywalking from those that bear on the law enforcement mission. Officer 
perjury thus presents an interesting test case for this section’s claim that 
increased legalism in a department makes officers more averse to 
breaking the law categorically, including in the course of their police 
work. 
C. A Note on Value and Criterion in Policing 
Instrumentalism and legalism each describe the attitude of a 
police organization towards the law. Instrumentalism indicates that a 
department regards law as a means—law is of importance only to the 
extent that it serves or constrains pursuit of a collateral policy goal—
while legalism signifies that law is viewed as an end in itself. Since 
instrumentalism and legalism both address orientation to law, they are 
not exhaustive of an organization’s values. Specifically, an organization 
may possess a legalistic or instrumental approach to the law while 
harboring other background values, values constitutive of an ultimate 
good that police believe their work serves. In like manner, legalism and 
instrumentalism are distinct from an organization’s criteria of success. 
Arrest rate, for instance, may be used to assess officers in both legalistic 
and instrumental departments. In this section, I will elaborate on the 
distinction between a department’s attitude to the law, its ultimate 
values, and its criteria of success. 
In a police department, a number of success criteria are possible: 
arrest rates, crime rates, conviction rates, polls of citizen opinion, the 
price of street drugs, and number of complaints are all possibilities. 
Moreover, any of these could be used in either a legalistic or an 
instrumental department. In an instrumental department, high arrest rates 
could indicate success on the theory that more arrests means more 
disorderly persons tagged and corralled. For a legalistic department, the 
same metric could indicate success because more arrests means more 
criminals are being apprehended and placed on the path to prosecution 
and conviction. 
Appreciating that the same criterion may be adopted for two 
different purposes allows us to understand how, in a modern order 
maintenance department, an insistence on producing high numbers of 
misdemeanor arrests and citations is consistent with instrumentalism. 
Recall that according to Harcourt, the number of misdemeanor arrests 
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increased in New York with the turn towards broken windows 
policing.167 The campaign against freelance windshield washing was 
also built on the tactic of ticketing squeegeemen and then arresting them 
when they failed to respond to the citation.168 Of course, the point of 
these arrests was not to enforce the law but to increase the level of order 
in the city. Since the recipe for increased order called for more arrests, 
measuring success based on number of arrests is perfectly consistent 
with an instrumental approach to the law. This is a truth obscured in 
Varieties of Police Behavior: In the book, only departments with the 
Legalistic style made a point of judging their success on the basis of 
arrest and ticket figures.169 
Just as an instrumental department and a legalistic department 
may share a criterion, they may also share the same ultimate values. 
Justice, safety, and quality of life are examples of ultimate values a 
department or an individual officer might harbor.170 In an order 
maintenance department, officers tasked with stepping up interdictions 
of turnstile jumpers (an order maintenance task) might sincerely 
describe their work in terms of “making the city a better place to live.” 
Although order maintenance defines the immediate task, the background 
value that allows officers to make sense of their work is promoting 
quality of life. In a legalistic organization, an officer arresting a juvenile 
for shoplifting might also describe what she is doing as “making the city 
a better place to live.” Here, the same background value is present and 
informs the officer’s work even if enforcing the law is treated, in 
practice, as a task of self-evident significance.171 
 167  See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 168  See KELLING & COLES, supra note 80, at 142–43. 
 169  E.g., WILSON, supra note 1, at 180. 
 170  Cf. Steve Herbert, Morality in Law Enforcement: Chasing “Bad Guys” With the Los 
Angeles Police Department, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 799, 799 (1996) (“[T]he 
enforcement of law is often understood by police officers as a moral as well as a 
legalistic enterprise.”). Herbert offers the example of an officer responding to a 
domestic violence call. Id. at 803–04. When the officer informs the victim that the law 
requires her husband be arrested, she protests. Id. at 804. The officer explains to the 
woman that the law gives him no choice, but he also tells her that what her husband has 
done “simply isn’t right” and that she will be able to sleep in peace if he is locked up. 
Id. 
 171  Readers with an eye for conceptual inconsistencies may insist that my past 
description of legalism, “regarding the law as an end in itself,” is inconsistent with what 
I now say about officers in legalistic departments holding to other ultimate values. After 
all, if something is truly an end in itself, then it cannot be valued for some underlying, 
collateral reason. There are two answers to this objection. The first is that legalism is a 
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The foregoing distinction between legalism and background 
values draws support from (and is needed to make sense of) certain 
passages in Varieties of Police Behavior. Wilson informs us that the 
police in Legalistic cities “do not arrest because they like making 
arrests . . . or love the penal code.”172 He goes on to say: 
 
The [Legalistic] chief also knows that the law is a device to 
achieve certain social objectives—order, peace, security, 
certainty, and liberty. He is aware that by enforcing certain laws 
he can achieve the purposes of other laws, and this gives him 
and his department a reason to enforce laws that otherwise might 
appear trivial and thus be ignored. Enforcing traffic laws is 
desirable not simply because it is their duty but because such 
enforcement is one way to prevent automobile accidents . . . . 
Furthermore, stopping cars for traffic infractions affords an 
opportunity to check the identity of the driver and the 
registration of the car; from time to time, the police discover 
fugitives, stolen merchandise, illegal weapons, and stolen cars 
this way. This, in turn, leads to even more arrests. 
 
The same instrumental view of the law extends into other areas 
where the police act on their own initiative. A drunk becomes 
the victim of a strong-arm robber; arrest him and you prevent a 
robbery. Juvenile vandalism can, the police believe, lead to a 
career in crime; better to investigate now, and take it seriously 
now. Teenagers loitering on a street corner at night might cause 
mischief later on . . . . Besides being illegal, vice also leads to 
trait of a department; I have stated elsewhere that the beliefs expressed by individual 
officers about their work are largely invariable across police styles—that they are a 
function of occupational culture, not organizational culture. The second reply is that the 
idea of “an end in itself” is being used loosely. While certain underlying values may 
give the law enforcement mission significance for the legalistic department and its 
officers, in practice, the law is treated as if it were an end in itself. In other words, law 
enforcement is approached like a prima facie good, even if in reality that approach is 
ultimately conditioned upon acceptance of background values. 
Another answer is that the background values function to rationalize or justify 
(when rationalization and justification are necessary) work that is otherwise cold, 
distressing, or bureaucratic. It is the occasions when a chief or line officer finds herself 
questioning the significance of arresting every juvenile shoplifter that the background 
value—making the community safer or its people happier—gets invoked to rationalize 
or impart meaning to the law enforcement practice. 
 172  WILSON, supra note 1, at 179. 
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muggings and the rolling of drunks; arrest prostitutes and you 
reduce the number of rollings.173 
 
At first glance, the quoted matter is at variance with the separation of 
legalism and instrumentalism. Wilson even uses the words “instrumental 
view of the law” in relation to a Legalistic department. From these 
paragraphs, it would seem that all departments are actually instrumental 
departments. However, a more deliberate reading shows that this is not 
the case. 
What Wilson wants to make clear is that police in Legalistic 
departments (both chiefs and patrol officers) are not law-enforcement 
automatons. He is not, however, abandoning the idea that Legalistic 
departments are distinguished by a focus on law enforcement. Notice 
how Wilson phrases his descriptions, “Besides being illegal, vice also 
leads to muggings.” Per Wilson, it is still important to the officer in a 
Legalistic city that vice is illegal, but officers are not blind to, and 
indeed value, the collateral benefits thought to stem from arresting 
prostitutes. In fact, these supposed wages of law enforcement might 
even be, at bottom, what grounds commitment to enforcing the law. And 
yet, they are still only background values, goods that the police hope or 
anticipate they are achieving by law enforcement. Even where order is 
the background value, there is still a difference between an order 
maintenance department, where law is only of importance insofar as it is 
believed to be a useful instrument of public order, and the legalistic 
department in which officers hope that public order will result if the 
laws are enforced. In the former, the laws will only be enforced as long 
as they are thought to be an effective tool; whereas in the latter, the laws 
will be enforced regardless, even if the police only have the faintest 
expectation that order will be achieved thereby. 
D. Legalism and Aggressive Policing 
The reader who notes the association of Wilson’s Legalistic style 
with proactive policing may for that reason doubt whether increased 
legalism could be a boon to civil liberties. As I previously described, the 
police in Legalistic cities were disinclined to turn a blind eye or practice 
live and let live when presented with a violation of the law.174 
Statistically, the Legalistic style entailed increased arrest rates, 
 173  Id. at 182. 
 174  See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
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especially for crimes of vice like prostitution.175 The police also insisted 
on the prosecution of shoplifters and writers of bad checks, even when 
the cheated merchant would rather not press charges.176 When it came to 
shoplifters, the police were said to “frown on stores that seek only 
restitution rather than prosecution.”177 In one Legalistic city, not even 
the child owners of unlicensed bicycles were exempt from police 
intrusion on behalf of the law.178 Most strikingly, Wilson describes how 
the aggressive law enforcement campaign in Oakland was experienced 
as harassment by the denizens of minority communities newly inundated 
with officers bent on identifying criminals and making arrests.179 This 
image, of police officer as equal parts busybody and rigid minder of 
rules, hardly betokens increased civil liberty. 
My first response to this objection is to clarify: I have not argued 
that a purely legalistic department is the key to a policing regime of 
perfect civil liberty but rather have made the narrower claim that cities 
with order maintenance departments could improve their civil liberties 
record by injecting their departments with a measure of legalism. In 
other words, my contention is that order maintenance departments fall 
too close to the instrumentalist end of the spectrum at present and could 
benefit from a move in the other direction. In this Article, I have given 
two reasons to think that pushing the needle back will be remedial: it 
will limit what is considered a police matter and increase officer 
compliance with the law. The former is a matter of assuaging excess in 
the order maintenance department and the latter is a request to tap a 
peculiar benefit that legalism offers. Wherever the ideal point for civil 
liberties along the legalistic–instrumental lies, this Article gives reasons 
to think that order maintenance departments are currently still 
somewhere on the instrumental side of it. 
My second response is also largely clarificatory: Wilson’s 
Legalistic style is not the same thing as legalism in terms of the 
legalistic–instrumental spectrum. Wilson identified the Legalistic style 
 175  WILSON, supra note 1, at 173–74. 
 176  Id. The association between aggressive policing and the Legalistic style was not lost 
on later authors. Slovak, who treated aggressiveness as one measurement of Legalism, 
writes, “Agencies in which officers on their own initiative make many arrests, give 
traffic citations, and intervene in local disputes are those Wilson would term legalistic.” 
SLOVAK, supra note 9, at 112–13. 
 177  WILSON, supra note 1, at 176. 
 178  Id. at 180. 
 179  Id. at 190 (speaking of the gratingly “high volume of police citizen interactions”). 
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to describe a collection of traits that he observed cluster together. As 
such, the style embraced several characteristics, only one of which was a 
focus on law enforcement.180 Apart from being aggressive, Legalistic 
departments were also formalized and professionalized, placing a 
premium on the use of technology and written reports.181 As I previously 
mentioned, the Legalistic departments of the 1960s that Wilson observed 
were already part of a movement in American policing, the 
professionalism movement, that would become the norm by the 
1980s.182 The turn to order maintenance in cities like New York came 
only after the professionalism movement had done its work at remolding 
American policing. This is the story of how the beat cop (the old 
Watchman departments) gave way to officers in cars (the 
professionalism movement), only to return to walking the streets at the 
behest of advocates of broken windows policing. 
Given this history, we should expect that a modern order 
maintenance department like the NYPD, having been shaped by the 
professionalism movement,183 would still match the Legalistic 
departments of the 1960s in respects other than orientation to law 
enforcement. As I previously explained, the modern order maintenance 
department is not to be confused with a passive, creaky Watchman 
department.184 To the contrary, apart from where the NYPD falls on the 
instrumental–legalistic spectrum, I assume that it still looks like the 
Legalistic departments of the past insofar as personnel practices, record 
keeping, and aggressiveness are concerned. Synergy between order 
maintenance and professionalized policing is illustrated by the testimony 
of dissident officers in Floyd v. City of New York:185 these officers 
testified to quotas imposed by stationhouse supervisors for arrests, 
citations, and stop-and-frisk.186 The use of such data by higher-ups to 
increase the scale of policing and the production of arrests was a method 
 180  See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
 181  See supra note 45–49 and accompanying text. 
 182  See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 183  The story told by Kelling and Coles’ book is largely one of police departments, 
including the NYPD, that had been transformed by the professionalism movement 
rediscovering the traditional order maintenance role of the police. See KELLING & 
COLES, supra note 79, at 77–89, 102–03, 108–09. 
 184  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 185  959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 186  Joseph Goldstein, Stop-and-Frisk Trial Turns to Claim of Arrest Quotas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2013, at A23. 
 
ISSUE 19:2 FALL 2014 
2014  BREAKING LAWS TO FIX BROKEN WINDOWS 149 
of Legalistic chiefs described by Wilson.187 Thus data collection, a 
legacy of the professionalism movement, continues to be used in New 
York in the pursuit of order maintenance ends. Although one might call 
for a return to the old laxity of the Watchmen departments, this issue is 
collateral to the question of whether a modern urban department should 
have a more instrumental or legalistic attitude towards the law. 
My final response addresses the fear that increased legalism will 
only escalate enforcement of petty misdemeanors, a concern reinforced 
by the breadth of contemporary penal codes.188  To assuage such fears, I 
argue that increased legalism means that police will judge the 
importance of violations of the law on the basis of what the law has to 
say about particular unlawful conduct rather than a collateral standard 
like that of broken windows theory. This is an adaption of a point made 
by Wilson in relation to Watchman departments, of which he writes, 
“The police are watchman-like not simply in emphasizing order over 
law enforcement but also in judging the seriousness of infractions less 
by what the law says about them than by their immediate and personal 
consequences.”189 
If we may assume that legalism, by contrast, entails that police 
will judge the seriousness of infractions by what the law says about 
them, then we may expect increased legalism to reduce officers’ efforts 
to enforce misdemeanor laws that are prioritized by broken windows 
thinking. For example, while the law defines graffiti, public intoxication, 
possession of small quantities of marijuana, and turnstile jumping as 
minor offenses, these possess outsized significance in broken windows 
theories. While we know from Varieties of Police Behavior that 
switching from a Watchman style to a Legalistic one entailed increased 
arrests for petty offenses, this may simply reflect a shift to the use of 
arrest rather than informal sanctions in response to the same crimes. It 
does not follow that Legalistic officers will spend more time responding 
to and investigating these offenses. On the contrary, we may fairly 
expect that where law enforcement is a department’s focus that their 
priorities will, to a greater extent than in order maintenance departments, 
match the hierarchy described in the penal code. As a result, the use of 
misdemeanor arrest might decline rather than augment with increased 
legalism. 
 187  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 188  See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 260 
(2011) (discussing contemporary legislatures’ penchant for defining new crimes). 
 189  WILSON, supra note 1, at 141. 
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Given the above objections, the reader may wonder how I 
imagine the streetlevel behavior of officers in a department that has 
received the recommended “shot of legalism.” Generally, my vision of a 
city with a legalistic police department is one in which the institutional 
culture reflects a belief that infringements of the Constitution are just as 
much lamentable departures from the rule of law as penal code 
violations. In such a city, an officer tempted to stop and frisk a 
pedestrian who looked “suspicious” to the officer, perhaps because of 
the color of the pedestrian’s skin or the neighborhood in which he is 
walking, would stop and consider that he would be violating the law 
himself if he cannot identify specific, articulable facts evidencing 
criminality.190 Even though the officer may believe that he could make 
the city safer by stopping everyone about whom he has a hunch, he sees 
an unconstitutional stop as a serious evil to be avoided and refrains from 
interfering with the pedestrian. 
I also imagine a department in which recognition that the 
authority of the police stops at the limits of the law is ingrained in the 
institutional culture. Imagine that an officer sees a group of teenagers 
standing on a street corner. They are loud and occasionally jeer 
passersby. Pedestrians are sufficiently scared or bothered that they walk 
to the other sidewalk when approaching the intersection. Before the 
officer uses her authority to interfere with the teenagers, formally or 
informally, she firsts asks herself if any laws are being broken. If the 
teens are not violating the law, she leaves them be, however disruptive 
of urban order their behavior may be. 
Furthermore, I conceive of a department in which enforcing the 
law by responding to imminent threats of crime and catching felony 
offenders is prioritized. This may mean that the police in a more 
legalistic department become reactive rather than proactive, that they 
focus on solving felonies after they are reported by citizens. In such a 
department, the work of detectives would be valorized, whereas the 
literature on order maintenance shows little interest in this police role. 
Of course, any benefits for civil liberties from increased legalism 
are limited by the law itself. If the law of investigative detention gives 
the police too much leeway to follow their hunches and prejudices or if 
legislatures criminalize too much conduct, strict adherence to the law 
safeguards only the rule of law, not substantive liberty and equality. 
Unless we assume that civil liberty is synonymous with legality, we 
 190  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
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must accept that aggressive policing of bad law can impair civil liberty. 
Nonetheless, I have argued that a move away from 
instrumentalism towards legalism will improve civil liberties in cities 
with order maintenance departments. Legalism, on the spectrum I have 
defined, does not entail that the police are aggressive or proactive like 
those in Wilson’s Legalistic departments. Moreover, increased legalism 
does not entail that departments will have the resources to enforce all 
criminal laws, all the time. Tradeoffs will be necessary. But whereas in 
order maintenance departments, those tradeoffs favor order 
maintenance—for instance, officers are required to meet stop and frisk 
quotas—in legalistic departments, those tradeoffs will favor enforcement 
of laws against serious crimes—for instance, more detectives are hired 
to investigate rapes and homicides. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article makes a conjecture about the relationship between 
where a police organization falls on the spectrum between 
instrumentalism and legalism and infringement of civil liberties by its 
officers. The Article leans on Wilson’s work: his insightful descriptions, 
his anecdotes, and his theories. At the same time, the Article draws 
lessons from Wilson’s work that diverges from those he drew himself. 
Broken Windows was a far more prescriptive piece than 
Varieties of Police Behavior. Knowing as he did the difference between 
a Watchmen department and a Legalistic department, Wilson was able 
to spot what he thought was the problem with American policing in the 
1980s: too much emphasis on crime control conducted from Crown 
Victorias, and not enough focus on the traditional work of the police of 
enforcing public order while walking beats. Because he understood so 
well the difference between Watchmanism and Legalism, Wilson knew 
that he was recommending police step outside the law to do their work. 
Using Wilson’s material, this Article takes the normative road that 
Wilson did not. Whereas Wilson called for order maintenance policing 
to restore the safety and livability of American cities, I emphasize the 
cost that order maintenance takes on civil liberties and how a move back 
towards legalism could abate that cost. 
This Article has hopefully shown that civil liberties violations 
are a product of order maintenance philosophies and that such 
violations, while not objectionable given an instrumental view of the 
law, are objectionable on a legalistic view. I argued first (in Section 
III.A) that violations are symptomatic of order maintenance because of 
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the expanded conception of the police role that order maintenance 
carries with it. I next contended (in Section III.B) that police in a 
legalistic department are more likely to obey the law, including its civil 
liberties provisions, themselves. For both reasons, I believe that a shift 
towards legalism can decrease police infringement of civil liberties in 
order maintenance police departments. 
 
